This essay will discuss some evidence that will try to pinpoint the main causes and consequences of the three Anglo-Icelandic Cod Wars, and also try to conclude if this could have been avoided by simple negotiations or if the outcome of this time period was inevitable due to circumstances surrounding it. The main points I will be discussing are the reasons why the Cod Wars commenced, the reasons of the first Cod War developing into a second and third, and the after effects of these events on Britain and Iceland with regards to economy and foreign relations.
Firstly, it is highly likely that the transition of sail to steam must have had a great bearing on what developed into the Cod Wars because the increase of catch capacity would have contributed greatly to the fish stock depletion. Other developments occurred before and during this time period and saw vessels such as the Fairtry made the freezing of fish possible, keeping the catch in good condition until the return journey. More men could also be carried on these vessels.[1]
The Second World War encouraged invention and innovation, particularly with regards to improvements on vessels. Navigational equipment and the echo sounder made the job of locating the fish easier. This also had a good effect on health and safety on a vessel. Due to the lack of fishing during the World Wars, stocks of fish were allowed chance to replenish themselves, making fishing very profitable soon after, but it was not long before the demand for fish for sale in fish and chip shops would have placed pressure on fishermen to return with a big catch from a quickly depleting resource to supply the demand.[2]
After the Second World War places like Poland, East Germany and Russia began to try and rebuild their own fishing industries, adding more pressure on the British fishing industry by giving them more competition. After both World Wars one of Britain’s main focuses was to renovate and rebuild its fishing industry as many vessels had been lost during the war efforts.[3]
Around the 1890s trawling only occurred near Icelandic waters in the summer months and focused around the Faroe Islands a bit closer to home in the winter months. The restriction of being able to fish around Iceland in the summer was later extended into the winter months most likely because of the development and construction of new larger vessels. Other fishing grounds also became popular as well as Iceland, such as Newfoundland and Greenland. Starkey states ‘It was not long before English trawlers were fishing right round Iceland, eighty from Hull and seventy from Grimsby making the three-week round trip by 1903’.[4] Iceland began to prove extremely popular as a fishing ground during the 1950s, largely due to trawlers suffering heavy damage to their nets in other areas, for example, around the coast of Greenland. It also seemed more logical to fish around Iceland rather than Greenland because fishing could be done for more days during a trip due to the closer locality. Some skippers who were daring enough could make some large profits around Greenland.[5]
The attempt to implement territorial zones was not unheard of before the Cod Wars erupted. Many countries already claimed to have some sort of exclusion zone ranging from three miles upwards, the results of which included arrests on British trawlers in 1948. Areas such as Norway and Iceland sought protection of its waters as its fishing industry was one of its main income sources for its populations. Robinson states ‘During the 1950s fish and fish products made up around ninety-five percent of all Icelandic exports.’[6]
Iceland had already raised problems of overfishing and fishing zones and limits previously, just after the Second World War and politicians had already attempted to revise the three mile limit that was already in place in between the World Wars. An attempt by Iceland to close its own Faxa Bay Nursery Grounds for the purpose of letting fish stocks naturally replenish again was quickly neglected after Britain refused to take part. The fundamental Conversation Law of 1948 was put forward by Iceland in the hope of being able to regulate fisheries in its own waters and this quickly developed into the First Cod War in 1958, ending in February 1961.[7]
One of the main problems that may have contributed to the development of the Cod Wars was the lack of government help during the 1950s. The fishing industry had to fend for itself, creating pressure on poor catches, low prices paid for the catch and rapidly declining profits. Hull also seemed to be very slow to change over to freezer carrying vessels, the first one being the Junella which was launched in 1968. This could have been a great disadvantage to an ever declining industry and should have been implemented sooner; however, the outcome of the Cod Wars would still have likely been the same.[8]
Overfishing of the same areas on a regular basis created a huge problem which created the main focus of the Cod Wars. The decision to create exclusion zones, not only around Iceland, left Britain with few fishing grounds left to use for the industry. The regularity and intensity of fishing the same grounds meant that the fish were not given a chance to spawn properly in order to keep a cycle of fish going.[9]
The Icelandic exclusion zones seemed to encourage other countries to follow suit, notably Denmark, the Faroes and Norway, and soon escalated to the point where no less than thirty eight countries had created an exclusion zone for fishing.[10]
Many European countries at first protested to Iceland’s original demands to extend the territorial zones, particularly at the Western European Fishing Industry meeting of 1958 where they pushed to declare Iceland’s actions as an illegal action. Iceland was driven by the need to preserve its fishing grounds especially as the decline of fish was more apparent in 1958 than it was in 1952.[11] This argument of stock depletion eventually opinion was swayed in Iceland’s favour, however, the final outcome shows Britain still failed to acknowledge this.[12]
From the culmination of the first Cod War, one of the consequences of this appears to be British stubbornness for any further negotiations with Iceland over its waters. Icelandic coastguard vessels often intercepted and tried to detain trawlers to stop them fishing, obviously leading to tension between the two countries. The British trawlers often had Royal Naval help from frigates who were within the areas and so the British fishing industry must have felt to some extent that they had support from the government. This only aggravated the situation and British trawlers were soon banned from taking their sick into Iceland, and risked arrest if they did so. Many vessels were also shot at and rammed.[13]
The new government that came to power in Iceland in 1971 worked once again to push for conservation of its own waters so as to encourage replenishment of fish stocks. The newly elected government felt so strongly about this, that the first day they came to office, they terminated the agreement that was already in force regarding the twelve mile exclusion zone and changed this to a fifty mile exclusion zone around the land from 1st September 1972; however British trawlers still refused to acknowledge this. This soon led onto the Second Cod War which was more destructive than the first. It was at this point Iceland chose to unleash its trawl wire cutter once again, a device that caused great financial loss to the sixty nine British and fifteen German vessels it was used upon.[14]
Britain gradually became interested in membership with the Common Market, however this was to prove a great disadvantage with regards to lowering import duties.[15]
British Royal Naval protection finally arrived sent by the government for the trawlers once more in 1973 where the box system was used once again after the trawlers had threatened to retreat unless better protection was provided. In November 1973, Iceland allowed Britain to fish temporarily within its zones for two years, but the agreement was withdrawn before the closure date after the decision of over one hundred nations backed Iceland’s plea to extend its fishing limits to two hundred miles at the third United Nations Law of the Sea conference. This decision came to power on July 15th 1975 and soon led to the Third Cod War. Later in the year of 1975 and following on to the next February, there were more ramming of vessels, leading Iceland to put their diplomatic relations in jeopardy with Britain, made worse by the refusal to completely withdraw Royal Naval warships from the areas.[16]
In May 1976 British vessels were temporarily permitted to have limited access to Icelandic waters for six months. When this agreement terminated in early December the waters of Iceland were finally closed fully for the final time to the British Industry. The grounds in the Arctic surrounding fishing zones of the Faroe Islands, Newfoundland and the Norwegian coast also pushed for similar fishing exclusion zones around each of their coasts, making most fishing grounds off limits to the British distant water fishing fleets.[17]
Britain’s attempt to extend its own exclusion zones were in vain after 1977 when all European Union nations decided to follow suit and extend their own exclusion zones to two hundred miles, forming what is known as the common pond, creating an equal opportunity for all European Nations to fish in each others waters.[18]
The airbase in Iceland belonging to the United States located at Kaflavik was very important to the development of the Cod Wars because NATO were worried of losing it and so had no choice but to comply with Iceland and back its decisions to extend the exclusion zones throughout the duration of the Wars. The presence of the Cold War and communism further threatened NATOs position, making them even more reluctant to lose an air base as it was in an important position for the United States to keep a watchful eye over an eager Soviet Union.[19]
Iceland as a fishing ground was probably the most important fishing ground to the British trawling industry as the evidence shows a decline in British industry at the same time and for the same duration of the Cod Wars until it finally collapsed after Iceland refused Britain any fishing rights in 1976. It had offered some of the most popular types of fish sought after by Britain in comparison to other fishing grounds. It was also a more logical place to fish compared to grounds around Greenland as it meant shorter travelling distance, and longer fishing time, both points very important to getting a good fresh catch home quicker as this meant higher profits for a journey.[20]
In conclusion one of the biggest causes of the Cod Wars was the depletion of fish stocks and the race to be able to get a good catch from what was left. The consequences of this over quite a prolonged period of time was the extension of fishing limit zones around particular countries, some of which used certain things to their advantage, for example the United States air force base would have been forced to exit Iceland had they disagreed with the two hundred mile limit they were attempting to enforce. Many different laws were introduced to diffuse the exploitation of fishing grounds, much to the upset to the British trawling industry and this decision eventually crippled one of Britain’s biggest industries, with the main effects seen in Britain’s main fishing ports such as Hull and Grimsby. Vessel ramming and warp cuttings alone had such a negative impact on fishing loads and profits. The large British fleet seems to have been unable to sustain its economy in such hard times. The culmination and outcome of the Cod Wars seems to have been inevitable due to Britain and Iceland’s stubbornness to acknowledge each others decisions regarding territorial fishing limits and resulted in large favour in support of Iceland’s demands.
Bibliography
Frank, Peter, Yorkshire Fisherfolk: A Social History of the Yorkshire Inshore Fishing Community, (Chichester: Phillimore and Company: 2002)
Gill, Alec, Village within a City: The Hessle Road Fishing Community of Hull (Hull: Hull University Press: 1986)
Johannesson, Gudni, Troubled Waters: Cod War, Fishing Disputes, and Britain’s Fight for the Freedom of the High Seas 1948-1964 (North Atlantic Fisheries History Association: 2007) pp. 267-304
Robinson, Robb, Trawling: The Rise and Fall of the British Trawl Fishery (Exeter: University of Exeter Press: 1996) Chapters 15 & 16
Starkey, David. J, Reid, Chris & Ashcroft, Neil, England’s Sea Fisheries: The Commercial Sea Fisheries of England and Wales since 1300 (London: Chatham: 2000) Chapters 19, 22 & 23
Thor, Jon, British Trawlers and Iceland 1919-1976, (Goteborg: University of Goteborg: 1995) pp. 111-240
[1] David J. Starkey, Chris Reid & Neil Ashcroft, England’s Sea Fisheries: the commercial sea fisheries of England and Wales since 1300 (London: Chatham, 2000) pp. 211-215
[2] Ibid. pp. 211-214
[3] Jon Thor, British Trawlers and Iceland 1919-1976, (Goteborg: Goteborg University, 1995) p. 227
[4] David J. Starkey, Chris Reid & Neil Ashcroft, England’s Sea Fisheries: the commercial sea fisheries of England and Wales since 1300 (London: Chatham, 2000) p. 211
[5] Ibid p.214
[6] Robb Robinson, Trawling: The Rise and Fall of the British Trawling Fishery (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1996) pp.224-226
[7] David J. Starkey, Chris Reid and Neil Ashcroft, England’s Sea Fisheries: the commercial sea fisheries of England and Wales since 1300 (London: Chatham, 2000) pp. 225-226
[8] Ibid. pp.215-216
[9] Jon Thor, British Trawlers and Iceland 1919-1976, (Goteborg: Goteborg University, 1995) pp. 229-230
[10] David J. Starkey, Chris Reid & Neil Ashcroft, England’s Sea Fisheries: the commercial sea fisheries of England and Wales since 1300 (London: Chatham, 2000) p. 226
[11] Jon Thor, British Trawlers and Iceland 1919-1976, (Goteborg: Goteborg University, 1995) pp. 225-226
[12] Robb Robinson, Trawling: The Rise and Fall of the British Trawl Fishery, (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1996) p. 231
[13] Ibid p. 231
[14] David J. Starkey, Chris Reid & Neil Ashcroft, England’s Sea Fisheries: the commercial sea fisheries of England and Wales since 1300 (London: Chatham, 2000) pp. 225-226
[15] Robb Robinson, Trawling: The Rise and Fall of the British Trawling Fishery, pp. 234-237
[16] Ibid pp. 240-242
[17] David J. Starkey, Chris Reid & Neil Ashcroft, England’s Sea Fisheries: the commercial sea fisheries of England and Wales since 1300 (London: Chatham, 2000) p. 226
[18] Ibid p.226
[19] Gudni Johannesson, Troubled Waters: Cod War, fishing disputes, and Britain’s fight for the freedom of the high seas 1948-1964 (North Atlantic Fisheries History Association, 2007)pp. 294-297
[20] Jon Thor, British Trawlers and Iceland 1919-1976 (Goteborg: Goteborg University, 1995) pp.230 -231
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